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HEADER

O 181617Z SEP 90

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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
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BT

CONTROLS

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

SERIAL: (U)

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF).

SUBJ: (U) SOUTH AFRICA--VIOLENCE/THE
SECURITY SERVICE PERSPECTIVE

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- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED SECRET-NOFORN
DOI: (U) 900916.

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USC 3024(i);Sec. 1.4(c)

SUMMARY: (S/NF)

VIEWS ON SOURCE OF CURRENT VIOLENCE ON THE REEF, THE
POTENTIAL FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE SAG FOR DEALING WITH IT.

TEXT: 1. (S/NF)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

THE ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN THE
JOHANNESBURG AREA.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

THE INITIAL OUTBREAKS
OF VIOLENCE IN THE SEBOKING AREA WERE INDEED INITIATED BY
INKATHA.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

INKATHAS OBJECTIVE WAS TO "PAY BACK THE ANC" FOR
UTILIZING SIMILAR TACTICS IN NATAL, E.G. TAKE THE WAR TO

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THE ANC'S TERRITORY AND CREATE THE SAME CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION THE ANC HAD BUILT IN AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE ZULU HOMELAND.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

STRENGTHEN INKATHA AND INSURE THAT IT HAD A ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. "THE BLACK OPPOSITION" AND SPECIFICALLY THE ANC AND INKATHA HAVE NOW ADOPTED STRATEGIES BASED UPON THE PERCEPTION THAT THE WHITE ELECTORATE IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE IRRELEVANT IN A POLITICAL SENSE UNLESS IT SIDES WITH A BLACK POWER BASE. FURTHER, INKATHA BELIEVES THAT THE WHITE ELECTORATE WILL ALLY ITSELF WITH THE "STRONGEST BLACK GROUP"--THE GROUP WHICH CAN DISRUPT, IF NOT CONTROL, GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. INKATHA DECIDED TO ACT WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT IT WAS LOSING ITS ABILITY TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON THE SAG AND OTHER BLACK GROUPS IN THE ONGOING POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

2. (S/NF) THE ANC AND THE MK SHARED A SIMILAR VIEW ON THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE STRENGTH TO THE WHITE ELECTORATE.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

INTERROGATION MK MEMBERS HAD CITED AS, AN EXAMPLE, U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNITA (E.G. THE U.S. SUPPORTS UNITA BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT "NOTHING CAN TAKE PLACE" IN ANGOLA WITHOUT UNITA'S INVOLVEMENT). IS OF THE OPINION THAT BOTH INKATHA AND THE MK ARE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO RECRUIT SUPPORTERS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY WHILE CONCURRENTLY DEMONSTRATING TO THE WHITE ELECTORATE THAT THEY CAN DERAIL THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION UNLESS THERE IS SOMETHING IN IT FOR THEM.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

3. (S/NF) THAT THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE WOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT "SOLID AND CLEAR EVIDENCE" OF MK COMPLICITY IN THE CURRENT WAVE OF VIOLENCE.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

AN MK PLAN TO INFILTRATE MK MEMBERS INTO THE ANC AT LARGE AS WELL AS INTO OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (INCLUDING COSATU AND THE PAC). MK MEMBERS ARE REPORTEDLY IDENTIFIED BY NAME AGAINST SPECIFIC POSITIONS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS--MOST OF WHICH ARE AT THE "MARSHAL" LEVEL.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

THE OPERATION WAS UNDERWAY AND THAT SOME MK PERSONNEL HAD ALREADY BEEN SUCCESSFULLY PLACED INTO POSITIONS.

THE MK OPERATION IS THE DIRECT RESULT OF MK LEADER CHRIS ((HANI))'S INFLUENCE ON THE ANC LEADERSHIP WHICH IS GROWING INCREASINGLY WORRIED OVER ITS

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

INABILITY TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE ANC MEMBERSHIP [REDACTED] SURE THAT NELSON ((MANDELA)) IS AWARE, AND IN FAVOR, OF THE PLAN SINCE HIS OWN EFFORTS TO MODERATE THE VIOLENCE OR TO SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SAG HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THAT MANDELA AND OTHER ANC LEADERS ARE BEING DUPED BY HANI. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] THAT HANI MAY BE CONDUCTING AN OPERATION WITHIN AN OPERATION AND THAT HIS REAL OBJECTIVE IS TO STRENGTHEN HIS OWN POSITION IN THE ANC THROUGH A COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE THAT WILL GIVE HIM THE POWER TO REGULATE THE RATE OF VIOLENCE AND THUS BECOME THE REAL POWER BROKER.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] CSI WOULD RECOMMEND TO THE SAG THAT IT APPROACH "THE BLACK LEADERSHIP, IN DUE COURSE" WITH THE "HARD EVIDENCE" IT IS PREPARING TO DISCREDIT HANI'S MACHINATIONS, STIMULATE A POSITIVE DIALOGUE, AND IDENTIFY WAYS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES THROUGH OTHER THAN VIOLENT MEANS. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] SUBSEQUENT PRESS REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE STATE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE "MEASURES FOR DEALING WITH THE UNREST" SOMETIME THIS WEEK. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

6. ~~(S/NF)~~ REGARDING THE QUESTION OF A "THIRD FORCE"

[REDACTED] THE MK ITSELF WAS THE THIRD FORCE AT WORK AND IMPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S REPORTED AGREEMENT WITH MR MANDELA ON THE SUBJECT. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

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COMING WEEKS "THERE WOULD BE A LOT OF DISINFORMATION AND PROPA GANDA" ABOUT VIOLENCE AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. HE SAID THAT CSI EXPECTED VIOLENCE TO CONTINUE, ALBEIT AT LOWER LEVELS, AND THAT INCIDENTS WOULD BE PERPETRATED BY THE "ANC, MK, AND INKATHA" IN SUCH A FASHION THAT THE OTHER SIDE, A THIRD FORCE [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] OR RIGHT WING EXTREMISTS OR WOULD APPEAR TO BE RESPONSIBLE.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

CSI'S RECOMMENDATIONS. FIRST AND FOREMOST, [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] IS THAT THE SAG DECISIVELY REESTABLISH CONTROL IN THE AFFECTED AREAS. STABILITY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS [REDACTED] ONCE CONTROL HAS BEEN RESTORED THE SAG SHOULD ACCELERATE THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND MOVE MORE QUICKLY ON RESOLUTION OF ISSUES BETWEEN THE SAG AND THE OPPOSITION. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] THAT THE SAG MUST MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT ALL OPPOSITION GROUPS PERCEIVE THAT THEY ARE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS AND THAT EACH GROUP'S INTERESTS ARE ADDRESSED. [REDACTED]

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] THAT IF MANDELA DID NOT SUPPORT SUCH AN EFFORT AT COMPROMISE, A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. [REDACTED] THAT PRESSURE WOULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY OTHER BLACK LEADERS WHO WOULD BE CALLING FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AND THAT MANDELA WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO RESIST SINCE HE WOULD THEN BE PERCEIVED AS THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

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